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Recent Developments
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION

REGULATIONS MANDATING THAT MASS TRANSIT SYSTEMS
BE ACCESSIBLE TO THE HANDICAPPED ARE BEYOND
THE SCOPE OF SECTION

504

OF THE

REHABILITATION ACT.

American Public Transit Association v. Lewis (D.C. Cir. 1981)
The Department of Transportation (DOT) issued regulations 1 on
May 31, 1979, requiring that all modes of public transportation 2 which
receive federal funds be made accessible to the handicapped within
specified time periods.3 The American Public Transit Association
(APTA) and twelve of its transit system members challenged the validity
of these regulations in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. 4 The plaintiffs alleged that by requiring "mainstreaming"
of the handicapped, 5 the 1979 DOT regulations exceeded the statutory

1. 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.81-27.107 (1980).
2. Id. at §§ 27.85-27.93. The regulations contained separate provisions for
bus, rapid and commuter rail, light rail, and paratransit systems, as well as a
blanket provision covering all other forms of mass transit. Id.
The individual modes of transportation supported by federal funds are
bus, subway, streetcar, and commuter rail systems. American Public Transit
Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811, 814 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd sub norn.
American Public Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
3. See 49 C.F.R. -§§ 27.81-27.97 (1980). These time periods ranged from
three to thirty years. However, special waivers were available for rail systems
under certain limited circumstances. Id. at § 27.99.
4. American Public Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C.
1980), rev'd sub nom. American Public Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272
(D.C. Cir. 1981) [circuit court decision hereinafter cited as APTA v. Lewis]. The
American Public Transit Association is a voluntary trade association located in
the District of Columbia. The members of APTA who joined as plaintiffs in
the district court suit were Boise (Idaho) Urban Stages, Brevard (County,
Florida) Transportation Authority, Dallas Transit System, Greater Cleveland
Regional Transit Authority, Indianapolis Public Transportation Corporation,
Kansas City Area Transportation Authority, Port Authority of Allegheny (Pennsylvania) County, Regional (Chicago) Transportation Authority, Spokane Transit System, Topeka Metropolitan Transit Authority, Transit Authority of the
City of Omaha, and Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority. Brief
for Appellants at i-ii, APTA v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
5. "Mainstreaming" is integrating handicapped persons into the same programs that are available to the non-handicapped. 655 F.2d at 1275.

(374)
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authority of the Secretary of Transportation 6 under section 504 of the
7
Rejecting this arguRehabilitation Act, and were therefore invalid.
ment, the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court and remanded, 9 holding
that if DOT had issued the regulations primarily to enforce section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, then the challenged regulations, by requiring mainstreaming, exceeded DOT's authority to enforce section

6. American Public Transit v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811, 821 (D.D.C.
1980), rev'd sub nom. American Public Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272
(D.C. Cir. 1981). When suit was brought Neil Goldschmidt was Secretary of the
United States Department of Transportation, and therefore was named as a defendant by the plaintiffs. 15 WEEKLY COMP. PmES. Doc. 1317 (July 27, 1979). By
the time the appeal was decided, Andrew Lewis had replaced Goldschmidt as
Secretary of Transportation. 17 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 14 (Jan. 20, 1981).
Consequently, Lewis was named as principal defendant in the appellate court's
decision. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
7. American Public Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811, 823-26
(D.D.C. 1980), rev'd sub inom.American Public Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d
1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The plaintiffs argued that the Secretary of Transportation's statutory authority to promulgate the regulations derived primarily from
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Brief for Appellants at 22-23, APTA
v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979).
It was the plaintiff's contention that a recipient of federal funds under
§ 504 had no affirmative obligation to "mainstream" handicapped persons.
Since DOT's regulations imposed such a burden, the plaintiffs contended that
they exceeded the authority of the Secretary of Transportation under § 504.
485 F. Supp. at 823, 826.
8. American Public Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811, 837
(D.D.C. 1980), rev'd sub nom. American Public Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d
1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The district court found that the Secretary's authority
to adopt regulations governing transportation of the handicapped was supported
by three statutes: § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III
1979); § 16 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMTA) of 1964, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1612 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); and § 165(b) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act
(FAHA) of 1976, 23 U.S.C. § 142 note (1976). 485 F. Supp. at 823-26. The
district court stated that the UMTA and FAHA authorized the DOT regulations, so that even if "section 504 would not independently justify the DOT
regulations," it did "further buttress the Secretary's exercise of his authority
under the Urban Mass Transportation Act and the Federal Highway Act." Id.
at 826. Given these statutory bases, the court concluded that the DOT regulations did not exceed the Secretary's statutory authority. Id.
9. APTA v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The appellants in the
case were APTA and eleven of its transit system members who had appeared
as plaintiffs in the district court. Id. at 1276 n.7. All the original plaintiffs
with the exception of the Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority
joined in the appeal. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
The case was heard by Judges MacKinnon, Mikva, and Edwards of the
District of Columbia Circuit. Judge Mikva wrote for the majority and Judge
Edwards filed a concurring opinion. 655 F.2d at 1273. Although appellants
raised several issues on appeal, the court only discussed whether the regulations
were a valid way of enforcing §'504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Compare Brief
for Appellants, id. with 655 F.2d at 1276-77.
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504. American Public Transit Association v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act l0 prohibits discrimination
against "otherwise qualified" handicapped individuals in programs or
activities which receive federal financial assistance." In 1976, DOT
issued a set of regulations 12 designed to implement 18 section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,14 section 16 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA),15 and section 165(b) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 (FAHA).16
10. Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979). Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act states in pertinent part: "No otherwise qualified
handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this
title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
11. See note 10 supra.
12. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,234 (1976). The 1976 regulations mandated that state
and local planners make "special efforts to plan public mass transportation
facilities and services" which the elderly and handicapped could effectively use.
Id. The regulations were accompanied by guidelines illustrating the kinds of
plans that satisfied the "special efforts requirement." Id. These guidelines
were issued jointly by the Urban Mass Transit Administration and the Federal
Highway Administration under authority delegated by the Secretary of DOT.

Id.
The definition of "special efforts" was set forth in the 1976 DOT regulations and added to appendix B of 23 C.F.R. § 450, subpt. A (1980). It states:
Tihe term "special efforts" refers both to service for elderly and handicapped persons in general and specifically to service for wheelchair
users and semiambulatory persons. With regard to transportation for
wheelchair users and others who cannot negotiate steps, "special efforts" in planning means genuine, good-faith progress in planning
service for wheelchair users and semiambulatory persons that is reasonable by comparison with the service provided to the general public and
that meets a significant fraction of the actual transportation needs of
such persons within a reasonable time period.

Id.
13. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,234 (1976).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979). For the relevant text of § 504, see
note 10 supra.
15. 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The relevant portion of this
provision states:
(a) It is hereby declared to be the national policy that elderly and
handicapped persons have the same right as other persons to utilize
mass transportation facilities and services; that special efforts shall be
made in the planning and design of mass transportation facilities and
services so that the availability to elderly and handicapped persons of
mass transportation which they can effectively utilize will be assured;
and that all Federal programs offering assistance in the field of mass
transportation . . . should contain provisions implementing this policy.

Id.
16. 23 U.S.C. § 142 note (1976). Section 165(b) of the FAHA provides:
(b) The Secretary of Transportation shall require that projects receiving Federal financial assistance . . . shall be planned, designed,
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In 1978, pursuant to an executive order, 17 the Secretary of Health,

Education, and Welfare (HEW) 18 issued guidelines implementing section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act 19 which other federal agencies were required to follow. 20

The HEW guidelines required all recipients of

federal funds to integrate, or "mainstream," 21 the handicapped into the
same programs available to non-handicapped persons.22 Since the 1976
DOT regulations 28 had provided for separate transit services to the
handicapped as an alternative to "mainstreaming," 24 they were now
inconsistent with the HEW guidelines. 25 Consequently, in 19'79 DOT
promulgated 26 new regulations 27 relating to mass transit
29
them into conformance with the HEW guidelines.

28

bringing

constructed, and operated to allow effective utilization by elderly or
handicapped persons who, by reason of illness, injury, age, congenital
malfunction, or other permanent or temporary incapacity or disability,
... are unable without special facilities or special planning or design
to utilize such facilities and services effectively. The Secretary shall
not approve any program or project to which this section applies which
does not comply with the provisions of this subsection.
Id.
17. 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976). This Executive Order was issued by President Ford shortly before the 1976 DOT regulations were published in their
final form. The Executive Order charged the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare with coordinating the implementation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act among various federal departments and agencies by establishing
guidelines for determining what practices were discriminatory. Id.
18. During the period relevant to this case, the department was known as
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Since the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals refers to the department as HEW in its opinion,
that designation has been used here. However, the department has since been
renamed the Department of Health and Human Services. See 20 U.S.C. § 3508
(Supp. III 1979).
19. 45 C.F.R. §§ 85.1-85.58 (1980).
20. President Ford's Executive Order directed other federal departments
and agencies to issue rules and regulations consistent with the standards and
procedures that the Secretary of HEW would ultimately establish. 41 Fed. Reg.
17,871 (1976).
21. See note 5 supra.
22, 45 C.F.R. § 85.51 (1980). The HEW guidelines permit separate treatment of the handicapped only if such treatment is necessary to provide handicapped persons with equal opportunity and truly effective benefits and services.
Id.
23. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,234 (1976).
24. Id. The 1976 regulations and their accompanying guidelines allowed
each local authority to choose the plan which, best suited local needs. Id.
Thus, a community could provide door-to-door "special services" to the handicapped in lieu of making fixed-route transportation systems accessible. Id.
25. Compare 45 C.F.R. §§ 85.1-85.58 (1980) (the HEW guidelines) with 41
Fed. Reg. 18,234 (1976) (the 1976 DOT regulations).
26. Shortly after the HEW guidelines appeared, DOT published a notice
of proposed rulemaking which stated that DOT was compelled by the HEW
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Prior to the effective date of HEW's guidelines and the issuance of
DOT's 1979 regulations, several federal courts had considered the impact
of section 504 upon mass transit systems.3 0 Each of these cases had been
brought by handicapped plaintiffs claiming, inter alia, that their rights
under section 504 had been violated because their local mass transit
systems were inaccessible to the handicapped.S The disposition of these
cases hinged upon the courts' interpretation of the obligations imposed
guidelines to adopt only "mainstreaming" options in its rules.
25,016 (1976).

43 Fed. Reg.

27. 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.-.129 (1980). The regulations generally required the
recipients of financial assistance from DOT to make existing and future programs and facilities accessible to the handicapped. These regulations consisted
of six subparts: subpart A, §§27.1-.29, generally prohibited discrimination
toward the handicapped in all federally funded programs; subpart B, §§ 27.31.59 specifically prohibited employment discrimination towards the handicapped
in programs receiving federal monies and required that these programs make
reasonable accommodations to the handicapped who are "otherwise qualified"
employees; subpart C, §§ 27.61-.69, stated the accessibility requirements for new
and existing facilities; sub part D, §§ 27.71-.79, set forth the accessibility requirements for airports, railroads, and highways; subpart E, §§ 27.81-.119, covered the
accessibility of mass transit to the handicapped; and subpart F, §§ 27.121-.129,
presented the procedures for enforcing these regulations.
28. Id. at § 27.81-.119.
29. Compare 45 C.F.R. §§ 85.1-.58 (1980) (the HEW guidelines) with 49
C.F.R. §§ 27.1-.129 (1980) (the 1979 DOT regulations).
30. See Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); United Handicapped
Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth.,
548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v.
Coleman, 451 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Vanko v. Finley, 440 F. Supp. 656
(N.D. Ohio 1977); Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Snow(len v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394 (N.D.
Ala. 1975), all'd mem., 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977).
31. See, e.g., Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863, 864 (2d Cir. 1977); United
Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 414 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v.
Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1279 (7th Cir. 1977); Michigan Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. Coleman, 451 F. Supp. 7, 8 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Vanko v.
Finley, 440 F. Supp. 656, 658 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp.
226, 228 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit
Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394, 395 (N.D. Ala. 1975), afi'd mern., 551 F.2d 862 (5th
Cir. 1977).
.In most cases involving § 504 claims, the plaintiffs typically have also alleged violations of the UMTA, FAHA, and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d at 864 (UMTA
claim); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d at 414 (UMTA, FAHA,
and fourteenth amendment violations); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548
F.2d at 1279 (UMTA, equal protection, and Architectural Barriers Act of 1968
violations); Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Coleman, 451 F. Supp.
at 859 (UMTA, equal protection, Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1975 violations); Vanko v. Finley, 440 F. Supp.
at 658 (UMTA, Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1975, fifth and fourteenth amendment violations); Bartels v.
Biernat, 427 F. Supp. at 228-29 (UMTA, fifth and fourteenth amendments, and
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1975
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by section 504.32 The courts generally agreed that transit systems had
to show that "special efforts" were being made to meet the mass transit
needs of handicapped persons.33 However, the courts differed with re,gard to the specific nature and scope of the "special efforts" required by
section 504.
'4
In Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Authority,.
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
held that section 504 had not been violated so long as mobility-disabled
persons could use defendant's transportation vehicles with the assistance
of others.3
Another view of the "special efforts" requirement was
adopted by the courts in Vanko v. Finley,s6 Leary v. Crapsey,87 and
violations); Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F.
Supp. at 395, aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977) (UMTA, fifth and fourteenth amendment violations).
32. See, e.g., Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1977); United
Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v.
Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1280-84 (7th Cir. 1977); Michigan
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Coleman, 451 F. Supp. 7, 10-11 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Vanko v. Finley, 440 F. Supp. 656, 666 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Bartels v.
Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226, 232-33 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Snowden v. BirminghamJefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394, 397 (N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd
mem., 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977).
33. Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415-16 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1282-83 (7th Cir. 1977); Michigan Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. Coleman, 451 F. Supp. 7, 10-11 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
Vanko v. Finley, 440 F. Supp. 656, 666 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Bartels v. Biernat,
427 F. Supp. 226, 232-33 n.8 (E.D. Wis 1977); Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson
County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394, 396-97 (N.D. Ala. 1975), afy'd mere.,
551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977).
34. 407 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ala. 1975). The wheelchair-bound plaintiff in
Snowden sought declaratory relief, an injunction restraining defendant DOT
from giving defendant Transit Authority federal funds, and an injunction restraining the Transit Authority from acquiring mass transit vehicles that were
inaccessible to the handicapped. Id. at 395. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant Transit Authority's failure to make its bus system accessible to the
handicapped was a violation of § 16 of the UMTA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. The
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment after concluding
that the Transit Authority had made sufficient "special efforts" towards aiding
handicapped persons other than those confined in wheelchairs. Id. at 396-98.
35. Id. at 397. Crucial to the court's decision was the fact that there was
at that time no safe, reliable device on the market for making buses accessible
to unassisted persons in wheelchairs. Id. at 396.
36. 440 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ohio 1977). In Vanko, a wheelchair-bound
plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 658. He claimed that
the "special efforts" requirement of the UMTA required the defendants to
make all mass transit vehicles and facilities accessible to handicapped persons,
and that by failing to do so, the defendants had violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and § 16 of the UMTA. Id. at 660, 662-63. The court disagreed
with the plaintiff's interpretation of the "special efforts" requirement and
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 665-70. According to the Vanko court, the "special efforts" requirement was satisfied by good
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38
Bartels v. Biernat.
These courts construed section 504 as mandating
the same "special efforts" requirement imposed by the UMTA a0 and its
implementing regulations-"good faith progress" in planning service for
the handicapped which is reasonably comparable to service for the gen40
eral public.
A broader reading of the requirements of section 504 appeared in
Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority.4 1 In Lloyd, the Seventh
Circuit held that section 504, when considered with its implementing
regulations, 42 established affirmative rights in the handicapped, 43 and
suggested a concomitant duty upon transit systems to embark on sub-

faith progress in developing a comparable mass transit system for the handicapped. Id. at 665-66.
37. 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977). The handicapped plaintiffs in Leary
sought equitable and declaratory relief and damages. Id. at 865. They alleged
that the defendant transit system's failure to provide them with an accessible
bus system violated both the UMTA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
at 864-65. The court remanded the case to allow the lower court to determine
whether the defendant's special efforts complied with the Urban Mass Transit
Administration's regulations. Id. at 864-66.
38. 427 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Wis. 1977). The Bartel court enjoined the
Milwaukee County Transit Board from acquiring buses inaccessible to the
handicapped until the Board could show that "special efforts," as set forth in
the 1976 DOT regulations, had been made to ensure that mass transit facilities
equivalent to those enjoyed by the rest of the community were available to the
handicapped. Id. at 231-33. See 49 C.F.R. § 613.204 (1980).
39. The Urban Mass Transit Administration is a component part of DOT.
U.S. Government Manual 445 (1978).
40. Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d at 865-66; Vanko v. Finley, 440 F. Supp. at
666; Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. at 232-33. The regulations implementing
the UMTA included the 1976 DOT regulations promulgated by the Urban
Mass Transportation Administrator under authority delegated by the Secretary
of DOT and under the authority of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, § 16 of the
UMTA, and § 165(b) of the FAHA. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,234 (1976). According to
part of the 1976 regulations, "[tlhe Urban Mass Transportation Administrator
will grant project approvals pursuant to 23 C.F.R. § 450.320(a)(3) only if: (a)
The urban transportation planning process exhibits satisfactory special efforts
in planning public mass transportation facilities and services that can be utilized
by elderly and handicapped persons." 49 C.F.R. § 613.204 (1980).
For the
statutory definition of "special efforts," see note 12 and accompanying text
supra.
41. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). In Lloyd, mobility-handicapped plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to restrain defendant transit authority
from designing or operating any new federally funded facilities that were inaccessible to the handicapped. Id. at 1279. The plaintiffs also requested a
mandatory injunction compelling the defendants to make existing transportation accessible to the mobility-disabled. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that the
defendants had violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by denying handicapped
persons meaningful use of federally funded mass transportation facilities. Id.
42. See note 12 supra.
43. 548 F.2d at 1281. These affirmative rights allow the handicapped to
bring a private cause of action to vindicate or protect those rights. Id.
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stantial remedial programs. 44 The Lloyd court stated that the remedial
.program must comply with the "special efforts" requirements of the 1976
DOT regulations. 45 In addition, however, the court stated, that the
requirements of the then proposed HEW guidelines, 46 if finalized, 'should
also be used in deciding whether the plaintiffs were entitled to remedial
47
action.
The court in Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Coleman.48
also considered the scope of the "special efforts" requirement of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 49 Since buses with wheelchair accessibility
options were now on the market, 0 the court questioned, but did not
resolve, whether the defendants had an obligation under the "special
efforts" requirement to order such buses immediately. 5 1
These decisions indicate that the federal courts were not in accord
2
in their interpretation of the obligations which section 504 imposed.
44. Id. at 1282-83.
45. Id. The Lloyd court cited the appendix of 49 C.F.R. app. § 613,
subpt. B (1980) as providing several examples of the level of effort needed to
satisfy the "special efforts" requirement. 548 F.2d at 1282. The examples
given were: a program for wheelchair users involving the average annual expenditure of five percent of the funds appropriated to an urban area; the purchase of only wheelchair-accessible equipment until one-half of the vehicles are
accessible; or the provision of a comparable substitute system which would
provide 10 round trips per week at fares comparable to those charged on standard buses. 49 C.F.R. app. § 613, subpt. B (1980), quoted in 548 F.2d at 1282-83
n.17.
46 See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
47. 548 F.2d at 1288. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case and instructed the district court to consider whether the defendants had complied
with § 504 and its implementing regulations, including the proposed HEW
regulations should they become effective by the time further proceedings were
conducted in the district court. Id. at 1287-88. Accord, United Handicapped
Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977).
48. 451 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
49. The plaintiffs in Coleman sought to enjoin the Southeastern Michigan
Transit Authority from purchasing vehicles inaccessible to the mobility-handicapped. Id. at 8.
50. Id. The Coleman court thereby distinguished Snowden, where such
buses had not yet been developed. Id. at 11. See generally notes 34-35 and
accompanying text supra.
51. 451 F. Supp. 7, 10-11 (E.D. Mich. 1977). The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, stating that "[t]he question remains
whether the defendants are required by the Urban Mass Transportation Act or
the regulations promulgated thereunder to order such buses immediately, since
buses with wheelchair accessibility options were available." Id. at 10-11.
The court decided to permit the plaintiffs to amend their complaint in
light of its opinion, and in light of developments in the law since the motion
was argued. Id. at 11.
52. Illustrative of the difficulties courts experience in interpreting § 504 is
Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Davis, 453 F. Supp. 825 (D. Col. 1978). In Atlantis,
the plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of handicapped persons against
the Secretary of DOT, the Administrator of the Urban Mass Transportation
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However, shortly before the effective date of DOT's 1979 regulations Ga
the Supreme Court was given its first opportunity to construe the scope
and meaning of section 504 in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis.64 In Davis, the plaintiff suffered from a severe hearing disability.55 Southeastern Community College had denied her admission to
its nursing program on the grounds that the plaintiff's disability not only
would preclude her participation in the clinical program, but also would
prevent her from safely performing in her proposed profession.56 The
Court concluded that the college had not violated section 504 because
respondent Davis was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped indi6
vidual" within the meaning of section 504. 7

The Davis Court also rejected the respondent's argument that
HEW's guidelines required Southeastern Community College to make
extensive modifications to accommodate disabled persons in its program. 58 According to the Court, neither section 504,50 nor the HEW
guidelines implementing section 504,60 imposed an affirmative obligation
Administration, and other defendants. Id. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
delivery and use of 213 buses which were inaccessible to the handicapped.
Unlike other courts, the Atlantis court made no attempt to determine the duties
which § 504 imposed. In rendering a declaratory judgment, the court stated
that "the federal statutes [§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and § 16 of the
UMTA] under which plaintiffs claim do not provide a sufficient definition of
the duties of the federal defendants to enable this court to give direction to
them." Id. at 831.
53. The effective date of the 1979 DOT regulations was July 2, 1979. 44
Fed. Reg. 31,443 (1979).
54. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
55. Id. at 400-01. An audiologist's report stated that plaintiff, with a hearing aid, could detect sounds, but that she could not discriminate sufficiently
among sounds to understand normal speech. Id. at 401, 403. To understand
speech, plaintiff had to look directly at the person talking and lipread. Id.
at 401.

56. Id. at 401-02.
57. Id. at 405-07. For the text of § 504, see note 10 supra. The Court
stated that "[ain otherwise qualified handicapped individual is one who is able
to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." 442 U.S.
at 406.
58. 442 U.S. at 407-12. Davis felt that the program should be adjusted to
her hearing disability. Id. at 407-08. The college argued that those modifications which would be necessary to enable Davis to safely participate in the
program would prevent her from receiving the benefits of the program. Id.
at 401-02.
59. Id. at 410-11. The Court stated that "neither the language, purpose,
nor history of § 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative action obligation
on all recipients of federal funds." Id. at 411 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 409-10. The Court concluded that if the HEW guidelines required "substantial adjustments in existing programs beyond those necessary to
eliminate discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals ....

they would

constitute an unauthorized extension of the obligations imposed by that statute."
Id. at 410.
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upon all recipients of federal funds.61 As a result, Southeastern Com
munity College had no duty to make substantial modifications in its
62
nursing program in order to allow respondent to effectively participate.
Although Davis was set in the context of a professional school program, 63 two recent decisions 64-Simon v. St. Louis County 65 and Upshur
v. Love 06-have applied the Davis Court's repudiation of an affirmative
61. Id. at 407-12.
62. Id. at 409-10 & 413. The Davis Court was careful to point out that
"the line between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination against the handicapped" was not always clear. Id. at 412. There
are situations, the Court said, where "refusal to modify an existing program
might become unreasonable and discriminatory." Id. at 413. The Court, however, declined to define or describe such situations, preferring to leave this
responsibility to HEW. Id.
63. The language of the Court suggests that the case only resolved the obligations which § 504 imposes upon educational institutions: "Section 504 by its
terms does not compel educational institutions to disregard the disabilities of
handicapped individuals or to make substantial modifications in their programs
to allow disabled persons to participate." Id. at 405.
64. See notes 65 & 66 and accompanying text infra.
Since Davis, the only court other than the District of Columbia Circuit in
APTA which considered the relationship between § 504 and mass transportation
in any detail was the Southern District of New York in Dopico v. Goldschmidt,
518 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See note 119 and accompanying text infra.
65. 497 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mo. 1980), afj'd in part, rev'd in part, 656 F.2d
316 (8th Cir. 1981). The plaintiff in Simon was a police officer who had become
a paraplegic after receiving a gunshot wound. 656 F.2d at 318. When the
department failed to rehire him, he brought suit under several federal statutes,
including § 504. Id. The defendants argued that in order to accommodate
plaintiff as an employee, the police department would need to make the following substantial modifications in its employment programs: restructure the transfer policy; provide the plaintiff with extra support staff; and keep plaintiff in a
small area. 497 F. Supp. at 151.
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Eighth Circuit in Simon interpreted Davis's prohibition against affirmative action as applicable only when
handicapped plaintiffs were not "otherwise qualified" individuals, such as when
they did not meet a federally funded program's legitimate physical requirements. 656 F.2d at 320. Since the Simon court found substantial evidence in
the record indicating that the St. Louis County Police Department's requirements were neither necessary, nor required of all officers, the court in Simon
suggested that their case might be distinguishable from Davis because the plaintiff in Simon might be an "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual. Id.
at 320-21. The court also questioned whether the accommodations necessary
to accommodate the plaintiff were substantial ones. Consequently, the Simon
court remanded the case for consideration of these two issues. Id. at 321.
66. 474 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1979). In Upshur, the plaintiff, a blind
teacher, had applied for a school administrative job. Id. at 334. When he was
not placed upon the list of candidates eligible for administrative positions within
the school district, he brought suit under § 504. Id. at 333.
In determining whether to place the plaintiff on its eligibility list, the
School District's Administrative Committee had asked the plaintiff how he would
cope with his handicap in fulfilling particular responsibilities. Id. at 335.
Upshur had responded that he expected to be assigned an aide who was fully
qualified to perform a wide range of administrative duties and that he would
simply rely upon the aide. Id. The school district, however, was not prepared
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obligation to an employment situation.0 7 Both courts concluded that
an employer is under no obligation to make substantial modifications
in a work situation in order to accommodate a handicapped individual. 8
However, the Fifth Circuit in Camenisch v. University of Texas 6l
and Tatro v. Texas 70 and the District Court for Connecticut in Lynch v.
Maher,7 1 have interpreted the Davis holding more narrowly 7 2 These
courts interpreted Davis as stating that where an individual's handicap
would preclude his benefiting from the program in question, section 504
imposes no obligation of affirmative action upon the recipient of federal
funds.73 Thus, the courts in these three cases distinguished Davis on
the ground that each of' the three suits involved plaintiffs who could
4
benefit from the federally funded program in spite of their handicap.
to hire an aide who was fully qualified to serve as an administrator. Id. at 342.
School officials thus concluded that the plaintiff's blindness would present significant problems, and since they were not confident that the plaintiff could
deal with those problems, the committee did not place him on the eligibility
list. Id. at 335, 342.
67. See notes 65, 66 & 68 and accompanying text supra.
68. Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d at 321; Upshur v. Love, 474 F.

Supp. at 341-42. After reviewing the record, the Upshur court concluded that
the school district had no obligation to hire an aide who was fully qualified

as an administrator in order to accommodate plaintiff's blindness and stated
that "[p]articularly in light of the Davis decision, . . . section 504 does not
require that degree of accommodation to the needs of handicapped individuals."
Id. at 342.
69. 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated as moot, 49 U.S.L.W. 4468 (April
29, 1981).

70. 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980).
71. 507 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Conn. 1981).
72. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text infra.

73. Tatro v. State, 625 F.2d at 564; Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616

F.2d at 132-33; Lynch v. Maher, 507 F. Supp. at 1280. For a more detailed discussion supporting this analysis of Davis, see Note, Defining the Rights of the
Handicapped Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 24 ST. Louis L.J. 159 (1979).
74. Tatro v. State, 625 F.2d at 564; Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616
F.2d at 133; Lynch v. Maher, 507 F. Supp. at 1280.
In Camenisch, the plaintiff, a deaf graduate student, alleged that the University of Texas had violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act when it failed to
provide him with sign language interpreter services. 616 F.2d at 129. The
Fifth Circuit, inter alia, upheld the district court's preliminary injunction which
required the University to procure and compensate a qualified interpreter for
the plaintiff. Id.
The Tatro court, relying on the decision in Camenisch, decided that a
school district's failure to provide a child suffering from spinal bifida with clean
instrument catheterization violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 625 F.2d
at 564.
The plaintiff in Lynch, a quadriplegic, brought suit under § 504 after the
Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance informed the plaintiff that it
would no longer pay for the home health care services he needed. 507 F. Supp.
at 1270. The court granted plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction re-
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Each court concluded that if a. handicapped person could benefit from
the federally funded activity,, then failure to make modifications to
75
accommodate him would constitute a violation of section 504.
It was against, this background that the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit began its analysis in APTA
v. Lewis of whether DOT's 1979 regulations exceeded the scope of
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.76 The court began by examining
the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the 1979 DOT regulations, and concluded that the statutory bases for these regulations were
section 504 and the related HEW guidelines. 7
To determine whether the 1979 regulations were within the scope
of the government's power to enforce section 504, the APTA court relied
heavily upon the Davis decision.78 It interpreted Davis as holding that
section 504 bans discrimination, but does not mandate affirmative action
to accommodate the handicapped. 9 It then applied the Davis holding
to 'the mass transit situation 80 and examined DOT's regulations to
determine whether the), required affirmative action. 8 '
The District of Columbia Circuit found that DOT's regulations did
req.uire extensive :modifications of existing transit systems in order to
make them accessible to the handicapped.8 2 These modifications would
quiring defendant to pay for plaintiff's home care, after distinguishing the case
from Davis. Id. at 1280. The court concluded that, unlike the situation in
Davis, providing Lynch with home care services would not require changing
the purpose or goal of.the program. Id.
. 75. Tatro v, State, 625 F.2d at 564-65; Camenisch v. University of Texas,
616 F.2d at 132-33; Lynch v. Maher, 507 F. Supp. at 1279-80.
76. 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
* 77. Id. at 1279-80.. The court pointed out that the 1976 DOT regulations
which :were intended to implement § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, § 16 of the
UMTA, and § 165(b) of the FAHA, did not mandate "mainstreaming." Id. at
1279. However, after the HEW guidelines were published in 1978, DOT stated
that it was bound by them, and evaluated options for consistency with the
HEW guidelines. Id. at 1275, 1279. The court found it significant that the
1979 regulations differed substantially from the 1976 regulations, although both
purported to implement the same statutory provisions. Id. at 1279. Furthermore, DOT's 1979 regulations were not promulgated until after the Secretary
of HEW approved them as being consistent with the HEW guidelines, and the
formal promulgation of the regulations explains them in terms of the HEW
guidelines enforcing § 504. Id. All of this evidence led the court to conclude
that if HEW had not issued guidelines inconsistent with DOT's 1976 regulations, DOT probably would not have issued new regulations. Id. at 1279-80.
78. Id. at 1277-78. See notes 54-62 and accompanying text supra.
79. 655 F.2d at 1277. The APTA court also stated that the Davis Court
had recognized a fine line between impermissible discrimination and permissible affirmative action. Id. See note 62 supra.
80. 655 F.2d at 1278. For a discussion of the applicability of this standard
to mass transit, see notes 99-105 and accompanying text infra.
81. 655 F.2d at 1278.
82. Id. at 1275-76, 1278. A transportation mode generally is considered
"accessible" when it can be used by wheelchair users. Id. at 1276. The court
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impose heavy burdens on local authorities.88 In the court's view, the
changes mandated by the regulations constituted exactly the kind of
burdensome program modifications that the Davis Court had found to
be beyond the scope of section 504.84 Consequently, the court decided
that the regulations exceeded DOT's authority to enforce section 504
and were therefore invalid.8 5
Having concluded that DOT had relied primarily upon section 504
in drafting the regulations,8 6 the court remanded 87 the case to DOT.
examined DOT's 1979 regulations, and observed that they required every bus
purchased after July 2, 1979 to be equipped with a wheelchair lift. Id. Furthermore, half of the buses on any mass transit system had to be accessible to
wheelchair users at the end of ten years. Id. See 49 C.F.R. § 27.85 (1980).
The requirements for subway and other rail systems were found to be
equally stringent. 655 F.2d at 1276. Subways and rail systems had to be retrofitted with elevators and "gap-closing" equipment which would enable wheelchair users to board trains. Id. "Key" subway and commuter rail stations,
which would comprise forty percent of all stations, had to be made accessible
to the handicapped, and connecter service between key stations and other
stations had to be provided. Id. In addition, new subway cars acquired after
July 2, 1979, and new commuter rail cars acquired after January 1, 1983, had
to be made accessible to wheelchair users so that the mobility-handicapped
could use at least one car per train. Id. Existing subway, commuter rail, and
streetcar systems could, however, apply for a special waiver if the metropolitan
planning organization, handicapped persons, and their representative organizations had planned an alternative service substantially as good as an accessible
rail system. Id. at 1276. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.87, 27.89, 27.99.
83. 655 F.2d at 1278 & n.12. DOT estimated that local authorities would
pay $460 million over 30 years in order to comply with the regulations. Id. at
n.12. However, the court felt that this estimate was too low because DOT had
only projected the total program cost at $3.2 billion while the Congressional
Budget Office had estimated that the total cost of the program would be $7.1
billion. Id. APTA estimated the costs to local authorities over the same period
to be $4.5 billion. Both estimates of the cost to local authorities were based
upon federal subsidies continuing at the level of 80% of the total program cost,
although there is no guarantee that the federal government will continue its
subsidies. Id.
84. Id. at 1278.
85. Id. at 1280. The District of Columbia Circuit thus reversed the decision of the district court which had found the regulations to be a valid exercise of DOT's statutory authority. APTA v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811,
826 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd sub nom. APTA v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272,(D.C. Cir.
1981). See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 77 and accompanying text supra. The APTA court noted
that the fact that the Secretary of DOT had followed HEW's § 504 guidelines
did not mean that he could not have made an independent policy decision to
take the same approach in enforcing other statutes. The court said that it was
merely holding that the events surrounding the promulgation of the 1979 regulations strongly suggested that the Secretary of DOT did not make such an
independent decision. 655 F.2d at 1280.
87. 655 F.2d at 1280. The APTA court discussed whether DOT's reliance
upon § 504 in promulgating the regulations warranted remanding the proceedings to DOT rather than considering the validity of the regulations under
other statutes. Id. at 1278-80. The 1979 DOT regulations had, in fact, cited
as authority not only § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but also § 16(a) of the
UMTA, and § 165(b) of the FAHA. See 49 C.F.R. § 27 (1980).
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According to the APTA court,: the remand would give the Secretary of
Transportation an opportunity to explain whether the 1979 regulations
had been based upon statutes other than section 504.88
Concurring, Judge Edwards stated that a remand was proper because the statutory basis for the regulations was ambiguous.89 He also suggested that the application of section 504 to public transportation raised
questions significantly different from those considered in the educational
setting of Davis.90 According to Judge Edwards, some affirmative action
may in fact be necessary to avoid discrimination in public transportation. 9' Consequently, he advised that the limits to the affirmative action
However, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found improper the
district court's assumption that statutes other than § 504 supported DOT's regulations. The court stated that "[w]hen an administrative decision is based upon
inadequate or improper grounds, a reviewing court may not presume that the
administrator would not have made the same decision on other, valid grounds."
655 F.2d at 1278, citing SEC v. Chenery Corp. (II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947);
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943). Since DOT had primarily relied

upon § 504, the APTA court concluded that established principles of administrative law precluded the court from finding an alternative basis for the DOT
Secretary's action. 655 F.2d at 2278-80. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp. (II),
332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp. (I), 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
The APTA court rejected the government's argument that Chenety was
inapplicable when the administrator had erred in interpreting a statute. Relying upon Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971), the circuit court asserted that as a reviewing court, it must determine
whether the administrator properly construed the scope of his statutory authority in making his decision. The court then said "[wjhen it is likely an administrator would not have enforced one statute the way he enforced another, a
decision promulgated on the basis of the wrong statute should be remanded
for his consideration." 655 F.2d at 1279. Thus, the court found it necessary
to remand the case to DOT. Id. at 1280.
88. 655 F.2d at 1280. The Secretary was instructed that if, on remand, lie
indicated that the regulations enforced other statutes, he should identify the
provisions of the UMTA or the FAHA or any other act that are enforced by
the regulations, and justify the regulations in terms of the cited provisions. Id.
89. Id. at 1280-81 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards pointed out
that the government had maintained in the district court and in its brief on
appeal, that § 504 alone provided sufficient authority for the challenged regulations. Id. at 1280 (Edwards, J., concurring). During oral argument, however,
DOT seemed to urge that the regulations were justified on the combined
authority of § 504, the UMTA, and the FAHA. Id. DOT then devoted most
of its argument to justifying the regulations under the UMTA, although at one
point government counsel suggested that each statute provided an independent
basis for justifying the regulations. Id. at 1281 (Edwards, J., concurring).
Consequently, Judge Edwards felt that the government's position was anibiguous and, therefore, the case should be remanded for a clearer explanation of
the government's position. Id.
90. Id.

See note 91 and accompanying text infra.

According to Judge
91. 655 F.2d at 1281 (Edwards, J., concurring).
Edwards, "in considering the accessibility of public transportation to otherwise
qualified handicapped persons, it is much more difficult to avoid 'discrimination'
without taking some kind of 'affirmative action.' " Id.
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that the government may order as a condition to granting federal funds
02
be defined.
In evaluating the APTA court's decision, it should be noted that
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit applied the
Court
the
rationale of Davis to the facts in APTA, without considering whether
such an application was warranted. 9 It is submitted that the APTA
court's reliance upon Davis is subject to criticism in two respects. First,
it is suggested that the APTA court gave the Davis decision a far more
sweeping scope than the Supreme Court had intended. The language
in Davis strongly suggests that the Court was only defining the obligations of professional schools under section 504, rather than interpreting
the effect of 504 upon all federally funded programs. 94 Consequently,
it is proposed that the applicability of the Davis decision should be restricted to two situations: those in which the plaintiffs would ultimately
derive no benefit from the program in question; 9 and those where
specific admissions criteria are relevant to the purpose and maintenance
of the program. 96 A broader interpretation of Davis is not warranted
92. Id. Judge Edwards stated that this resolution should be made on a
proper administrative record which unequivocally sets forth the statutory authority and factual basis for the action taken. Id.
93. See id. at 1278. The facts of Davis involved an educational institution.
See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
94. See note 63 supra. The Supreme Court, in fact, began its opinion by
stating that the issue confronting the court was "[w]hether § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 .. .forbids professional schools from imposing physical
qualifications for admission to their clinical program." Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added). The Davis Court
further asserted that "[s]ection 504 imposes no requirement upon an educational
institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to accomnodate a handicapped person." Id. at 413 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Significantly, the court concluded its opinion by stating that "[n]othing in the
language or history of § 504 reflects an intention to limit the freedom of an
educational institution to require reasonable physical qualifications for admission to a clinical training program." Id. at 414 (emphasis added). For a
further discussion that the Davis holding be read narrowly, see generally Note,
supra note 73.
95. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra. Since handicapped
persons would benefit from accessible public transportation, it is submitted that
the Davis decision should not have determined the outcome in APTA. Additional support for the benefit that handicapped persons would receive from the
1979 DOT regulations mandating "mainstreaming" comes from studies showing
that separate but equal treatment can cause psychological damage to the handicapped. 655 F.2d at 1275 n.5.
96. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra. The employment situation is similar to the admissions process at post-secondary schools. In both
situations there are predetermined criteria relevant to performance in the job
or program, which all applicants must meet. In the Davis, Upshur, and Simon
cases, the plaintiffs were not "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals" if
they did not meet the necessary standards required for admission to the program. Thus, the factual similarities between these two situations warrant an
application of Davis's rationale to cases like Upshur and Simon which involve
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because neither Davis nor any post-Davis decision suggests that the decision should automatically be applied to all cases brought under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 97 Furthermore, to interpret Davis
more broadly would, in effect, sanction separate treatment for handicapped persons and thus frustrate one of the primary purposes of
section 504.98
Secondly, it is submitted that the APTA court ignored the factual
differences between the APTA and Davis cases, as Judge Edwards noted
in his concurring opinion.99 In Davis, and in the two cases which
applied the Davis holding to the employment situation, the plaintiffs
were not "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals." 10o In sharp
contrast are the Lynch, Tatro, and Camenisch cases,1 01 in which the
plaintiffs were "otherwise qualified," 102 and the courts required the
federally funded program to accommodate their special needs. 10
It is submitted that a handicapped person seeking to use mass
transit is an "otherwise qualified individual," 104 thus making the mass
the employee selection process when the requirements are legitimate and necessary for the job. Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d at 320-21; Upshur v.
Love, 474 F. Supp. at 341-42. For a discussion of Simon and Upshur, see notes
65-68 and accompanying text supra.
In the mass transit situation, the only requirement relevant to the purpose
and maintenance of the program is possession of the fare. Consequently, it is
submitted that requiring that mass transit users be ambulatory is not relevant,
and therefore the Davis rationale is inapplicable to the APTA situation.

97. See notes 65-75 and accompanying text supra.
98. The purpose of § 504 cannot be served by separate but equal treatment,
because such treatment can, in itself, be discriminatory. See Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d at 1283-84 n.20, 43 Fed. Reg. 2134 (1978). Thus,
separate but equal treatment of the handicapped runs counter to one of the
stated purposes of § 504, that of preventing federally funded programs from
discriminating against the handicapped solely on the basis of their handicap.
See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
99. 655 F.2d at 1281 (Edwards, J., concurring).
100. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-07, 413 (1979); Simon v. St. Louis
County, 497 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Upshur v Simon, 474 F. Supp. 332,
341-42 (N.D. Cal. 1979). Lending support to this interpretation is the fact that
on appeal, the Simon court questioned whether Davis was applicable to the facts
of the Simon case because the record contained evidence suggesting that the
plaintiff was, in fact, an otherwise qualified handicapped individual. 656 F.2d
at 320-21. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra.
102. See Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d at 564; Camenisch v. University of Texas,
616 F.2d at 132-33; Lynch v. Maher, 507 F. Supp. at 1279.
103. Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d at 564-65; Camenisch v. University of Texas,
616 F.2d at 136; Lynch v. Maher, 507 F. Supp. at 1280-81.
104. Mass transit is intended to serve the general public, and the only requirement for admission is payment of the fare. Thus, handicapped persons
seeking to use mass transit are, unlike the plaintiff in Davis, "otherwise quali-
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transit situation analogous to the facts of the Lynch, Tatro, and
Camenisch cases. 1°5 By not considering these decisions construing Davis,
the APTA court avoided an important question-whether the Davis
rationale is applicable to a situation where potential plaintiffs are "otherwise qualified individuals."
Another fundamental problem inherent in the APTA decision is
the court's failure to draw a clear line between impermissible and permissible affirmative action.' 06 It is submitted that by stating that impermissible affirmative action occurs when section 504 is implemented
through large expenditures, 107 the APTA court has not resolved the
problem. Comparable alternative transit systems for the handicapped,
as authorized by the 1976 DOT regulations, 0 8s or the "special efforts"
requirement of the new 1981 interim DOT regulations,109 would also
result in costly expenditures.11 0 By providing no guidelines as to what
constitutes a "modest expenditure" which does not exceed the scope
of section 504, the APTA decision subjects every accommodation made
on behalf of handicapped persons to potential challenge in the courts."'
fled" handicapped individuals once they are able to pay the fare. For the Davis
court's definition of an "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual, see note
57 and accompanying text supra.
105. The plaintiffs in Lynch, Tatro, and Camenisch were otherwise qualified handicapped individuals as defined by Davis. In Lynch, the plaintiff sought
to continue participating in a federally funded program for the homebound.
507 F. Supp. at 1270. The plaintiff in Tatro sought admission to a public
school, while the plaintiff in Camenisch was enrolled in the University's graduate program. Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d at 558-60; Camenisch v. University of
Texas, 616 F.2d at 129.
106. See 655 F.2d at 1278.
107. Id.

108. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
109. 46 Fed. Reg. 37,489 (1981) (to be codified in 149 C.F.R. pt. 27). DOT
promulgated these 1981 interim regulations in response to the APTA decision.
They are a slightly modified version of the 1976 regulations.
110. See APTA v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811, 816 n.9 (D.D.C. 1980)
rev'd sub norn. APTA v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 44 Fed. Reg.
31,456 (1976). APTA estimated that the annual operating cost of a dial-a-ride
paratransit service for the handicapped would be $159 million.

485 F. Supp.

at 816 n.9.
111. It seems unlikely that the cost of an alternative transit system for the
handicapped, estimated by APTA at $159 million annually, would constitute a
modest expenditure. See note 110 supra. Thus, it is submitted that the APTA
decision leaves open the possibility that even the "special efforts" requirements
of the DOT regulations and the 1981 interim DOT regulations could also be
construed as "affirmative action."
It should be noted that the Lloyd and Andre courts spoke of compliance
with the "special efforts" requirement of the 1976 regulations as affirmative
action. See Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1282-83 (7th Cir.
1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 416 (8th Cir. 1977).
If the "special efforts" requirement constitutes substantial affirmative action, as it
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It is maintained that the court should have considered, as Judge
Edwards suggested, the type and degree of affirmative action that the
government may mandate in the mass transit situation. 112 Crucial to
such a determination would be the consideration of the purpose underlying mass transit, and how it differs from the purpose of other programs
It is further suggested that more than
affected by section 504.11
-modest affirmative steps" 114 are necessary if mass transit systems are to
conform with section 504, because neither alternative transit systems nor
modifications in existing systems can be accomplished without large
expenditures. 1 5 The need for mass transit systems to engage in affirmative action on behalf of the handicapped was correctly recognized by the
Lloyd court."16 By failing to analyze whether it was possible for mass
transit systems to accommodate the handicapped absent substantial
affirmative action, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not
provided future courts with any guidance as to what constitutes permissible affirmative action in the mass transit situation. 1 7 Consequently,
the decision invites court challenges to all accommodations mass transit
systems make on behalf of handicapped persons which cost money, because such expenditures might possibly constitute impermissible affirmative action outside the scope of section 504.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the APTA decision has raised
more questions than it has answered concerning the obligations which
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act imposes upon mass transit."18
most assuredly does given the estimated cost of alternative transit programs for
the handicapped, then the 1981 DOT regulations could be successfully challenged
and invalidated under the rationale set forth in APTA. As the costs of alternative transit programs increase, the probability that a transit system will bring
a suit claiming that the "special efforts" requirement constitutes impermissible
affirmative action also increases.
112. See 655 F.2d at 1281 (Edwards, J., concurring).

113. See notes 96, 104 and accompanying text supra. Mass transit systems
attempt to attract as many riders as possible, whereas the employee selection
process and admissions procedures for professional schools are characterized by
exclusivity and selectiveness.
114. 655 F.2d at 1278. The APTA court would allow modest expenditures
to accommodate the handicapped on mass transit. Id.
115. See note 110 supra.
116. See notes 45, 47 & III and accompanying text supra.
117. See note 114 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that a more
useful approach would have been for the APTA court to specify the percentage
of a transit system's budget that must be expended to avoid impermissible discrimination. Additionally the court should have stated, in a percentage, the
upper limit of amounts that transit systems could spend on behalf of the handicapped without the spending being challenged as burdensome affirmative action
in violation of Davis.
118. See notes 106-16 and accompanying text supra.
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Furthermore, the APTA decision may have deprived handicapped plaintiffs from judicially seeking greater access to mass transit under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.119

Kathleen A. Frederick
119. A recent decision suggests that this may be the APTA court's contribution to the case law surrounding § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In Dopico v.
Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), handicapped plaintiffs brought
suit against their local mass transit system claiming that local defendants had
violated, inter alia, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide plaintiffs with an accessible mass transit system. Id. at 1165-67. The plaintiffs sought
injunctive and declaratory relief to compel defendants to comply with various
statutes and regulations enacted by Congress on behalf of the handicapped.
Id. at 1166-67. Included among these statutes and regulations, were the "special
efforts" requirement of § 16 of the UMTA, and the 1976 DOT regulations which
construed "special efforts" as genuine, good faith progress in planning service
for wheelchair users that was comparable to service provided for the general
public. Id. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
The district court dismissed plaintiff's section 504 claim, stating: "Regardless of what APTA has done to the 1979 DOT regulations, it has clearly held
that § 504 does not permit the kind of massive modifications that the regulations require and plaintiffs seek to compel in this action . . . . § 504 cannot
serve as a basis for the relief requested." 518 F. Supp. at 1176.
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